Temp Staff, Leavers and Shared Passwords: The Access Review UK SMEs Should Run Before December

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Access changes are easy to miss because they rarely announce themselves. There is no outage, no ticket and no alarm. An account simply keeps working for someone who no longer should have it.

That might be a contractor whose three-week engagement ended, a member of staff who moved department but kept their old permissions, or a departing finance manager whose account remains enabled “just in case”. Add December’s temporary cover and the shared password nobody remembers setting, and the picture gets less comfortable. The systems did not change. The people did, and nobody told the systems.

The risk is not confined to a dramatic departure. Access drifts in small increments, often without anyone approving it. An attacker relies on those gaps. An assessor may find them while sampling access records. A timely review is one of the least expensive ways to improve resilience, and mid-November is a sensible moment to do it, before seasonal staffing changes add more accounts to the mix.

Empty key slots and blank identity cards suggesting access left behind

Start with Disaster Recovery. A recovery plan is only executable by people who have both the authority and credentials to carry it out. Who is entitled to declare an incident? Who holds restore rights? What happens if the one administrator with those rights has left, or is unreachable when the business needs them?

A runbook that depends on a departed administrator’s credentials is a document, not a plan. Recovery time objectives agreed in business language are of little use if nobody can log in as the right person at 2am. Confirm that named people can initiate recovery, access the necessary systems and restore critical services. Then make sure those permissions are available to an appropriate backup, without leaving broad administrator access in place indefinitely.

For organisations running IBM i Management, the review deserves particular care. Legacy IBM i (AS/400) estates can accumulate user profiles nobody created deliberately, profiles belonging to people who left years ago, and shared profiles used by an entire department. Elevated authority may have been granted as a shortcut long ago and never reduced. Sometimes nobody still working there remembers why.

The platform may be stable and business-critical; that does not make its access arrangements self-explanatory. Review user profiles, group membership, special authority and access to relevant objects and applications. Check which profiles are shared, who uses them and whether named access can replace them. Where a shared profile is still necessary for a particular process, document its owner, purpose and controls rather than treating it as invisible infrastructure.

This is where practitioner experience matters. My background includes IBM i system administration as well as Google-certified IT project management and multi-national onboarding. The practical lesson is consistent: a system’s history can outlast the people who understood its original decisions. Managed IBM i cover should include a documented review of profiles and authority alongside operational dependencies such as scheduled jobs. That gives the organisation a clearer view of who can do what, and what could fail if a key administrator disappears.

Legacy enterprise server cabinet with subtle gold accent lighting in a quiet infrastructure room

The same discipline applies when a business moves its finance operations to Dynamics 365 Business Central. A supported cloud core can provide role-based access and an auditable record of changes, but moving to the cloud does not remove the need to govern permissions. Through a Dynamics 365 Jump Start, the strategic question is not simply how to get a system running. It is how roles, approvals and access should support the way the organisation needs to operate.

Consider a professional services firm where the departed finance director’s account remains enabled on an ageing on-premise system because disabling it feels risky. That is not a safe continuity plan; it is an unresolved control decision. Review who can post journals, approve payments and change supplier bank details. Does one person still hold all three capabilities? If so, decide whether that combination is justified and what independent checks are required. A licence assigned to someone who has left is both an avoidable cost and a control gap. Microsoft’s Business Central security guidance provides further detail on permissions, approvals and separation of duties.

Technology Expense Management belongs in the same conversation. An access review and a licence review are often the same exercise performed twice by different people. Licences may still be billed for leavers; duplicate accounts may exist; a contractor subscription may renew automatically; a mailbox may still be paid for without a current owner.

The aim is evidence-based rationalisation, not cost-cutting for its own sake. Confirm who uses each service, whether the access remains necessary and whether the associated spend delivers value. Then remove or reassign licences in line with business requirements and retention obligations. This makes the return on review tangible: stronger control, clearer accountability and fewer costs that no longer serve the organisation.

Some of the most overlooked access is not an account at all. Network Solutions and Voice and Connectivity need to be part of the review too. A Wi-Fi password may predate the current team. A VPN token may never have been revoked. A switch or firewall may still use a shared administrator login. A phone extension or direct dial may route to a former employee’s mobile. A generic mailbox may be read by three people and owned by nobody.

These are operational access paths, even when they do not appear in a user directory. Identify who knows shared credentials, what systems depend on them and who is responsible for changing them. Plan credential changes carefully so that legitimate services are not interrupted. Replace shared administrative access with named accounts where practical, and assign a clear owner to shared mailboxes and phone routing.

Helpdesk Support and Managed IT Services are useful here as bolt-on execution behind a sound strategy. A joiner, mover and leaver process run through the helpdesk can turn access control into a repeatable operation. Each request should identify the person, the change, the systems involved, the approver and the date access was changed or removed. That produces evidence rather than relying on someone’s memory or an informal message.

The consultancy work comes first: decide what access is appropriate, who approves exceptions and how the organisation will verify completion. Support teams and trusted specialist partners can then carry out the agreed process at scale. Without that strategic definition, a checklist simply makes an unclear process more consistent. Where a business needs related services beyond its IT estate, the wider group of Evestaff services is set out at evestaff.co.uk.

ISO 27001 and Cyber Essentials are guided consultancy domains, not products to purchase as a substitute for control. Assessors look for evidence: access reviews, starter and leaver records, privileged access lists and proof that permissions were removed, not assurances that someone intended to do it. Multi-factor authentication and a documented access review cycle are the kinds of controls an assessment may sample. The NCSC guidance on identity and access management also recommends covering staff, contractors and temporary users, and reviewing unnecessary privileges.

December access should be authorised, time-limited, recorded and removed on a set date. A temporary member of staff covering a busy period should have a named sponsor and a known end date. If the assignment changes, review what they still need rather than letting the original permissions accumulate.

A useful mid-November review can start with a complete list of active accounts across every system, including cloud services, finance platforms, remote access, network equipment, telephony and shared mailboxes. Mark who still works for the organisation, and identify contractors and temporary staff with their sponsors and end dates. Ask what each person actually needs today, rather than what they were once given. Confirm that former staff and departed contractors no longer have access, and change shared credentials that have remained untouched for years, after checking their dependencies.

Finally, confirm by name who can declare a disaster and who can restore critical systems. Record the decisions and who completed each change. Then diarise the same review for the first working week of January. December will have changed the picture again. A short, deliberate check now is cheaper than discovering the gap when an auditor asks, or when the wrong person logs in.

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