The Shared Login Nobody Can Retire: Getting Identity and Access Right in UK SMEs

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A shared login usually starts with a practical intention: make it easy for a small team to get work done. Then people change roles, suppliers come and go, and nobody is quite sure who still knows the password. The account becomes part of the furniture, and a quiet risk hiding in plain sight.

For a UK SME, identity and access management (IAM) is not simply a password exercise. It is a business decision about who can reach which systems, what they can do there, and how quickly that access can be changed when circumstances shift.

The right starting point is strategy. As a Fractal IT Director, David Evestaff helps businesses shape an IT plan around their operational needs and risk, then put the right controls in place. The objective is not to add friction for its own sake. It is to make secure access workable, accountable and straightforward to manage.

Several overlapping keys with one set apart, symbolising shared accounts and the need for individual accountability

The problem with “everyone uses that account”

A shared account can make it impossible to establish who took an action. If a supplier payment is changed, a mailbox rule is created or a file disappears, the audit trail may identify only the shared login, not the person behind it.

Shared credentials also make ordinary changes harder than they should be. When someone leaves, changing one password might seem sufficient. But who needs the replacement? Where else was the password used? Has it been saved in a browser, written down or passed to another supplier? The more people who have used the account, the less confidence you can have that access has really been removed.

Where a service genuinely requires a shared or non-personal account, it should be treated as an exception. Document its business purpose, assign a responsible owner, restrict its permissions, and decide how credentials are stored and rotated. It should not be the default way people sign in.

Password reuse links separate risks

Reusing a work password for a personal account can turn a leak outside the business into a potential route into business systems. Criminals may try exposed passwords against other services, hoping people have reused them.

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) advises using a password manager to store unique passwords and, where appropriate, generate them. It can also autofill passwords on the correct website, helping to reduce the risk of entering credentials on a fraudulent lookalike page.

For passwords people need to remember, the NCSC’s three random words guidance offers a practical approach. Avoid predictable choices such as names, significant dates or familiar substitutions. The goal is a password that is hard to guess and manageable to use, not an elaborate puzzle staff will solve by reusing the same password everywhere.

A business password manager needs a clear operating model too: decide who administers it, how access is granted, how staff are supported, and what happens if an employee or administrator leaves. Secure the manager account itself with multi-factor authentication (MFA), and make sure recovery arrangements do not depend on one person’s personal device or memory.

MFA matters most where the consequences are highest

MFA adds a second check to a password, for example, approval through an authenticator app or a security key. It helps protect an account if a password is guessed, stolen or reused elsewhere. The NCSC recommends 2-step verification for important accounts, including email, because access to a mailbox can help criminals reset passwords on other services. Its 2-step verification guidance explains the options and why enabling it matters.

Prioritise accounts that can open doors to many others: email, cloud administration, remote access, finance systems and password management. Administrative accounts deserve particular attention. An administrator who browses the web and reads email using an account with broad privileges carries avoidable risk into everyday tasks. Use a separate standard account for normal work and a distinct privileged account for administration. Grant elevated rights only when needed, and review them regularly.

A secure doorway and authentication token in a dark, understated setting, representing layered access protection

The Cyber Essentials requirements for IT infrastructure set a useful baseline. They require organisations to control user accounts and privileges, use unique credentials, disable accounts when no longer needed, and use separate accounts for administrative activity. MFA must be implemented where available, and authentication to cloud services must always use MFA. For administrative accounts, the requirements also call for MFA.

These are practical safeguards, not a reason to enable every setting without considering how people work. Choose methods staff can use reliably, keep recovery options secure and test the arrangements before relying on them in an incident.

Use single sign-on to make control simpler

Single sign-on (SSO) lets people access multiple services through an organisational identity. Instead of managing separate credentials for every application, the business can centralise sign-in and apply consistent controls where services support it.

SSO can improve the staff experience, but it also makes the central identity account especially important. Protect it with MFA, restrict its administrative privileges and monitor unusual sign-in activity. Keep a record of business services connected to organisational identities, including tools adopted by individual teams. A service linked to a work email address can still hold business data even if IT did not procure it.

A strategic review should also consider how access fits with the wider environment: Cloud Solutions, on-premise systems, remote working, supplier support and recovery arrangements. For example, identity controls should be considered alongside Disaster Recovery planning: restoring systems is not enough if the right people cannot securely access them, or the wrong accounts remain active.

Some businesses also rely on specialist legacy platforms. Where IBM i is in use, user profiles and green-screen access need to be included in the same access review, rather than treated as an exception outside the wider policy. IBM i Management can support that specialist work.

Make leavers’ access disappear properly

A leaver process should cover more than disabling an email account. List the services, devices, shared resources and supplier portals the person could access. Revoke sessions and tokens where appropriate, recover company equipment, transfer ownership of business data, and remove privileges from systems that are not connected to the main identity platform.

Do not overlook temporary staff, contractors or third-party support accounts. Give each person an individual account where possible, agree what access is needed and when it ends, and confirm revocation rather than assuming it happened. If someone changes role, review what they no longer need as well as what they now require.

An access card being removed from a desk beside a secured laptop, representing a structured employee offboarding process

A simple joiners–movers–leavers process can make this repeatable:

  1. Joiners: approve the account, assign role-based access and require MFA before access is granted.
  2. Movers: review existing permissions when responsibilities change; do not simply add new access on top.
  3. Leavers: disable accounts promptly, revoke access to connected services and document completion.

The process should name an owner and leave a record of approvals and changes. A short checklist that is used every time is more valuable than a perfect policy nobody follows.

Start with a review, not a shopping list

An effective IAM plan begins by finding out what exists. Identify important systems and accounts, who owns them, how people sign in, whether MFA is enabled, and which accounts have elevated privileges. Look for shared logins, dormant accounts, third-party access and services linked to work email addresses.

Then rank the gaps by business impact. An exposed administrator account is not equivalent to an old account for a low-risk tool. Agree a sequence that the organisation can implement and support, and measure progress through outcomes such as named access, MFA coverage and timely leaver access removal.

This is consultancy-first work: set the direction, clarify responsibility and decide which controls will deliver practical risk reduction. Cyber security and compliance support can help align those decisions with the organisation’s wider security posture. Managed IT Services, Helpdesk Support, Network Solutions, Voice and Connectivity, software licences and other operational services should be bolt-on execution that supports the overarching IT strategy, not a substitute for deciding what the business needs.

Where helpful, a trusted network of specialist partners can provide focused implementation. Technology Expense Management can also help identify whether the business is paying for overlapping or unused services, while preserving the controls it needs. The point is not to buy more technology. It is to make access clear, proportionate and capable of being changed when people or responsibilities change.

If a shared login has become too awkward to retire, that is a useful signal: the business needs a plan for identity, ownership and access, not merely another password reset. For more about the wider Evestaff group, visit evestaff.co.uk.

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